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This essay highlights a phenomenon that has no place in the conventional theory of 
sophisticated business contracts:  the term that makes no sense as an enforceable promise, 
one that defies functional explanation, one that drafters blush to rationalize in retrospect 
or chalk up to honest mistake.  The subset of contract drafters who stop and think about 
the term before the contract is signed know that it has little enforcement or other 
instrumental value.  Even if a court were to enforce such a term, its interpretation would 
be extremely hard to predict at signing.  Nevertheless, such clauses get included in 
contracts between sophisticated parties.  Why?  The authors speculate that some terms are 
in business contracts because the process of formalizing certain feelings about the parties’ 
relationship in an official and routine manner characteristic of business contracting 
provides value to the parties.  They suggest that such value is, at least in part, the 
satisfaction of expressing their feelings publicly and formally.  The authors introduce the 
concept of “feel-good formalism” to describe the impulse to express feelings in contract 
terms, with limited or no regard for the terms’ instrumental utility.   
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Etymologically this is not entirely a nonsense word:  super- 
“above,” cali- “beauty,” fragilistic- “delicate”, expiali- “to atone,” 
and docious- “educable”, the sum of which equals “atoning for 
extreme and delicate beauty [while being] highly educable.” 
-Richard Lederer, Crazy English (1989) 
 
 
 
I. Introduction:  Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious 
 
This essay highlights a phenomenon that has no place in the conventional theory of 
sophisticated business contracts: the term that makes no sense as an enforceable promise, 
one that defies functional explanation, one that drafters blush to rationalize in retrospect 
or chalk up to honest mistake.  In the typology of suboptimal contracting, this nonsense 
term is adjacent to but distinct from the wildly ambiguous term, which might reflect 
incomplete information, a deliberate agreement to disagree,1 or a commitment to stay out 
of court.2  The nonsense term is inserted intentionally, and thus different from a true 
oversight.  It may be brand new and nonsensical from the start; or it may have lost 
meaning over time, yet is deliberately retained in the contract.3  It may occasionally look 
                                                 
 American University Washington College of Law and Duke University School of Law.  We are grateful 
to David Snyder and two anonymous reviewers for the Queen’s Law Journal for helpful comments on an 
earlier version,  to Lee C. Buchheit for still talking to us, and to Sean Sherlock for excellent research 
assistance. 
1See e.g. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, “Principles of Relational Contracts” (1981) 67 Va. L. Rev. 
1089 at 1091. 
2 Claire A. Hill, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit:  Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts” 
(2009) 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 191. 
3On “sticky boilerplate” terms that are retained despite being suboptimal (though not necessarily nonsense), 
see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, “Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The 
Economics of Boilerplate”)” (1997) 83 Va. L. Rev. 71; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, “The Limits of 
Expanded Choice:  An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms” (1985) 
73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 [Goetz & Scott].  See Mitu Gulati &Robert E. Scott, Three and a Half Minutes (2009) 
[unpublished, archived with authors] for a full literature survey and catalogue of theoretical explanations of 
boilerplate stickiness. 
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like an illusory promise (“I will if I want to”), traditionally unenforceable in contract law, 
yet it is purposefully bargained for by the other side.  It is unlike a recital, which may 
describe the parties’ motives for entering into the contract but is not generally intended 
for direct, functional implementation.4  The nonsense term purports to tell the parties 
what to do, but simply does not work, and makes this defect transparent to anyone who 
pauses to read it twice, to say nothing of the sophisticated business people whom it 
purports to bind.   
 
We speculate that some nonsense terms are in business contracts at least in part because – 
like “supercalifragilisticexpialidocious” in Disney’s film version of Mary Poppins – they 
make the parties feel good for saying the words.  To be sure, such terms usually make 
more linguistic sense than the “eighteen consonants and sixteen vowels” in the ditty, yet a 
drafter who stops to think about the term before the contract is signed knows full well 
that no party would sue on it, no court would enforce it, and it would make little if any 
difference in the normative constitution of the parties’ relationship – it would give the 
breacher no added pause before breaching.5  Yet one side insists on the term because it 
expresses something, something it wishes to say publicly and formally about the 
relationship it is about to enter.  We call this phenomenon “feel-good formalism” to 
denote an anti-instrumental, aesthetic and sentimental attraction to legal form, in which 
the primary aim is to make the speaker feel better for deploying the form.  Our adoption 
of the term “formalism” is admittedly unorthodox; we use it to link our examples both to 
the literature on the production of contract documents, and to the debate about judicial 
interpretation and drafting incentives.6   
                                                 
4Recitals may stop short of being performative utterances.  See Claire A. Hill, “A Comment on Language 
and Norms in Complex Business Contracting” (2001) 77 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 29 [Language and Norms]. 
5 This essay is limited to terms that have neither legal nor normative “bite”.  Some terms that have no legal 
force have strong normative pull and are bargained for this reason; they are beyond the scope of this essay. 
6 We rely in part on Annelise Riles’s exploration of the formalist aesthetic. Annelise Riles, “The 
Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case of Japan’s Netting Law” (2000) Stanford/Yale Junior 
Faculty Forum, Research Paper No. 00-03, online: Social Science Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=162588>.    The term formalism is used differently 
throughout the law literature; in recent contracts scholarship, it has come to describe a subset of reactions to 
20th-century legal realism, which favor judicial interpretation strategies that hew close to the plain meaning 
of express contract terms and rely less on the social context.  See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999) (describing the wide range of meanings ascribed to the term “formalism” by 
law scholars, published in a symposium exploring the range).  We are mindful of the risks inherent in using 
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We illustrate what might be feel-good formalism with examples from emerging market 
sovereign debt contracts; however, we suspect that the phenomenon occurs throughout 
business contracting.  Moreover, if it turns out that the feel-good motive drives the 
production and use of nonsense terms, it is likely present, albeit less prominent, in the 
parts of the contract that make more functional sense. 
 
We begin by describing what we believe to be one of the purest examples of a feel-good 
term, the promise never to seek restructuring of a debt instrument, which became 
standard in the Brady Bonds issued by poor and middle-income governments beginning 
in 1990.  These bonds were the last and most successful policy response to the debt crisis 
that gripped middle-income and poor countries in Latin America and elsewhere for most 
of the 1980s.  They also marked a shift from commercial bank loans to capital markets 
finance for governments in developing countries, and the start of what became the multi-
trillion dollar emerging markets bond market.7  Bond contracts in this relatively young 
market are the subject of our remaining examples. 
 
After exploring the peculiarities of Brady Bond anti-restructuring terms, we move to the 
feel-good aspect of the pari passu clause, an old and sticky term which became a rallying 
cry for equal treatment among the creditors of defaulting sovereigns in the late 1990s.  
We revisit the controversy surrounding the term using our expressive lens.  Finally, we 
recount recent changes in sovereign debt documentation that made it virtually impossible 
to alter the contractual choice of litigation forum, even as they made it much easier to 
                                                                                                                                                 
a term that has been debated at length and in depth, and has become quite loaded.  See e.g., Lawrence B. 
Solum, Legal Theory Blog:  Choi & Gulati on Contracts, Dec. 30, 2005 at 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2005/12/choi_gulati_on_.html (addressing the use of the term 
“formalism” in an earlier paper co-authored by one of us).  We see an offsetting benefit in linking to the 
formalism conversation:  we explore new motives behind the parties’ attachment to particular nonsense 
terms.  To the extent such attachment helps support the broader bargain, a “formalist” court faces the 
challenge of enforcing terms that are difficult or impossible to operationalize. 
7 EMTA. History and Development, at http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=34 (last visited Nov. 2, 
2009).  See also infra note 11.  The volume of debt outstanding has recently hovered around $500 billion.  
See J.P. Morgan, Tradeable Index Strategies:  Emerging Markets, at  
http://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/research/EMBI (listing the market 
capitalization of the leading index at $486.90 billion as of October 30, 2009). 
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reduce the principal and interest on the underlying debt.  Lawyers involved in this 
innovation justified the apparent disconnect primarily in expressive terms.  
 
II. Don’t Even Ask 
 
By 1989, the bankers were tired.  Tired of not getting paid, tired of weekend calls from 
government officials, tired of hearing echoes of their own footsteps in the stone corridors 
of the New York Fed, and more than anything, tired of seeing one another’s long faces 
around the endless parade of conference room tables in London, Paris, New York, Manila 
and Buenos Aires.   
 
A cascade of sovereign debt crises, beginning with Mexico’s payment suspension in 
August 1982, prompted concerted international efforts to preempt outright default using 
serial payment reschedulings, “quasi-voluntary”8 injections of new money by old 
creditors to service old debts, and all manner of accounting gimmicks to help forestall the 
recognition of pervasive debt distress on the queasy balance sheets of the world’s leading 
financial institutions.  For all the headaches it caused the banks, what came to be known 
as the Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s had dire effects on the borrowers:  a “lost 
decade” of economic decline and human suffering, an ever-growing debt burden, and a 
succession of painful economic reform programs under the auspices of the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund. 
 
After seven years of quietly assuring commercial banks that they would suffer no losses 
on their developing country exposure, the U.S. Administration shifted tactics.  Nicholas 
F. Brady, the new Treasury Secretary, gave a speech in March 1989 in which he stressed 
the centrality of “both debt and debt service reduction” — words that had been taboo — 
for achieving a durable end to the crisis.9  The speech was not only a turning point in the 
                                                 
8On this and other “idiotic” euphemisms in sovereign debt restructuring during the 1980s, see Lee C. 
Buchheit, “You’ll Never Eat Lunch in this Conference Room Again” (1992)11:2 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 11. 
9 Nicholas F. Brady, “Dealing with the International Debt Crisis” Remarks before a Conference on Third 
World Debt Sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods Committee (Mar. 10, 1989),  
U.S., 89 Deptartment of State Bulletin (No. 2146)(Washington, D.C.: United State Government Printing 
Office,  May 1989). 
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crisis, but also in the development of the international financial markets and the 
underlying legal infrastructure. 
 
The Brady Bonds were tradable instruments that banks received from their debtors (the 
developing country governments) in exchange for writing down their loans.10  Mexico 
issued the first batch in 1990.  The Brady Bonds catalyzed the revival of international 
sovereign bond markets, which had been largely dormant since the defaults of the Great 
Depression.  The Bradies’ documentation was principally a combination of old loan, 
corporate bond, and original contract drafting, but it also reflected the drafting 
conventions in a thin smattering of sovereign bonds issued over the decades of market 
dormancy.  Brady Bond contracts in turn became the template for emerging market 
sovereign bonds, a market with an annual trading volume over $6.5 trillion in the mid 
2000s.11  
 
Lawyers who participated in the Brady restructurings offered a critical insight into the 
underlying contract drafting.  At heart, the new bonds were not “market instruments but 
rather crisis instruments created specifically by the creditor banks as a prerequisite for 
agreeing to significant debt and debt service reduction.”12 
 
By 1989, the bankers were tired – but they were also angry with Brady and his principal 
deputy, Treasury Under Secretary David Mulford, for making them take losses when they 
had been promised for years that they would not have to.  Commercial bank creditors that 
agreed to accept the Brady Bonds demanded an ironclad promise that they would never 
again be dragged to the same conference rooms over the same countries.  The result was 
a set of exceptionally strict anti-modification provisions, requiring the consent of every 
single bondholder to amend the payment terms of any bond.  Also included was, in the 
                                                 
10 For a concise summary of the Brady Plan from the financial industry perspective, see The Brady Plan, 
online: Emerging Markets Traders Association <http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=35>. 
11 Significant Market Events and EMTA Accomplishments, online: Emerging Markets Traders Association 
<http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=70>. 
12 See e.g., James Hurlock & Troy Alexander, “The Fire Next Time: The Dangers in the Next Debt Crisis” 
(1996) 15:3 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 14. 
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words of one borrower representative, “the most fatuous thing ever to have been put into 
an agreement”:13 
 
[The sovereign] will not, directly or indirectly, seek any restructuring or 
rescheduling of the Bonds or any provisions thereof, nor will it, directly or 
indirectly, seek or request any loans, advances, extensions of credit or other 
financial accommodation from any holders of the Bonds or any affiliate thereof 
based upon such holdings.14 
 
Such a formal promise never to seek a debt restructuring was new in the Brady Bonds.  It 
also made little practical sense.  Suppose a sovereign borrower bound by the clause ran 
out of funds, or decided to stop paying, and sought to renegotiate.  The creditor might 
refuse, which would give the debtor the choice between continued performance and 
payment default.  Under the “don’t even ask” clause excerpted here, the creditor would 
also have the right to sue in the absence of payment default.15  Yet no one involved in 
negotiating the Brady contracts has suggested that the risk of such a lawsuit could deter a 
debtor contemplating default from merely requesting relief.  If it existed, such a threat 
appears to have had no impact on Ecuador’s 1999 decision to proceed with the first 
default and restructuring of the Brady Bonds that were issued just four years earlier.16 
                                                 
13 Interview of Lee C. Buchheit (9 July 2009). 
14 This provision is excerpted from The 1992 Philippine Bond Fiscal Agency Agreement, Republic of the 
Philippines, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, and Banque Paribus Luxembourge, 1 
December 1992, 1 at 24.  Substantially the same language appears in all other Brady Bond contracts of 
which we are aware based on our own examination of such contracts and conversations with lawyers 
involved in the drafting of Brady Bond documentation. 
The excerpted provision is distinct from the classic anti-modification term, which has come to be 
disfavoured in U.S. contract doctrine.  See e.g., Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration, 122 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 
1919) (“Those who make a contract, may unmake it.  The clause which forbids a change, may be changed 
like any other.”)  Unlike the Brady term, which only binds the sovereign, the provision invalidated by 
Justice Cardozo in Beatty – a general prohibition of oral modification and waiver – purported to bind both 
parties.  See e.g., Christine Jolls, “Contracts as Bilateral Commitments:  A New Perspective on Contract 
Modification” (1997) 26 J. Legal Stud. 203.  Explicit formal restrictions on modification are also distinct 
from structural and functional barriers that may make modification difficult or practically impossible.  The 
unanimity requirement for amending payment terms, present in all Brady Bonds, may be characterized as a 
combination of formal and functional barrier:  unanimous consent is so difficult to attain that its 
requirement is tantamount to a formal prohibition on amendment.  For a typology of anti-modification 
devices, see Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, “Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts:  Workout Prohibitions 
in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities” S. Cal. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2009]. 
15 The creditor might also sue based upon the excerpted clause to enjoin a restructuring agreed upon by 
other bondholders — except that there could be no such restructuring as a practical matter where the 
contract requires unanimous consent by every bondholder.   
16See Lee C. Buchheit, “How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap” (2000) 19:12 Int’l. Fin. L. Rev. 17. 
The “don’t even ask” provision was sufficiently bothersome for Ecuador to ask creditors participating in its 
Brady Bond exchange to vote to delete it from the old bonds.  It seems ironic in retrospect that, unlike the 
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Why, then, did the creditors insist on, and borrowers accept, such nonsense in their 
contracts?  The borrowers’ answer seems simple: it would cost them nothing “because it 
was so fatuous.”17  Unlike other provisions in business contracts that are not normally 
intended to be enforced as written,18 a “don’t even ask” clause would not shame a would-
be defaulter into paying, or deter a casual inquiry into restructuring terms (assuming such 
inquiries are ever made).19  The clause offers no road map, jogs no memory, administers 
no truth serum to debtor government functionaries.20  For the serially defaulting 
sovereign,21 it seems costless and strongly resembles a textbook illusory promise (“I will 
not seek to restructure until I do”). 
 
The creditors’ motives are harder to discern, and potentially more interesting.  Some have 
suggested that the new term was an attempt at retribution, and a shot across the bow 
aimed less at the borrowers, than at the international official sector – rich country 
governments and international financial institutions – seen as betraying earlier promises 
not to force bankers into debt relief.22  Yet neither the term nor anything else in the 
contract purported to bind official actors.  Although the officialdom of the day most 
likely felt a reputational stake in the outcome, the contract between the debtor and its 
creditors was an odd place to express it.   
                                                                                                                                                 
payment terms, the solemn promise never to seek restructuring could be amended by a simple majority of 
the bondholders. 
17 Supra note 12. 
18 Hill details at least a dozen in Language and Norms, supra note 4. 
19 We suspect that the normative pull of such a clause may be weaker for a sovereign than for a private 
debtor because it is likely to represent a moral or political commitment of a different government.  And to 
the extent the clause purports to sanction a restructuring request, rather than payment default, its political 
legitimacy may be difficult to maintain in economic distress even where a government would prefer to pay. 
20 Language and Norms, supra note 4. 
21 See Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, Debt Intolerance, 2003 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (2003). 
22 Cf. George Triantis & Mitu Gulati, “Contracts Without Law:  Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt” (2007) 
75 U. Cin. L. Rev.  977 (suggesting that some of the contract terms in sovereign contracts might serve a 
creditor-multilateral communication function). See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, “Multilateral 
Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework” (1988) 35 
IMF Staff Papers 644 (discussing sovereign debt restructuring as a multilateral process including debtors, 
creditors, and the official sector).  This is distinct from the view of the contract as the parties’ 
communication of the substantive terms of their relationship to the state qua courts for subsequent 
enforcement, described in Goetz & Scott, supra note 3 at 262.  Here the recipient of the message is some 
combination of the Executive, multilateral institutions, and independent agencies such as central banks. 
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In retrospect, government officials privy to the Brady negotiations sound sheepish about 
the clause.  In the words of one senior official at the U.S. Federal Reserve at the time, 
“You bloody lawyers while I was asleep let the Bradies go forward with ‘cross our heart 
and hope to die…’ ”23  They suggest that the clause served as symbolic reinforcement of 
the Bradies’ status as exit instruments for long-suffering banks, and may have reaffirmed 
what was then believed to be a practical reality – that bonds held by a multitude of 
atomistic creditors dispersed worldwide could not be restructured, at least not without 
causing a global financial cataclysm.   
 
For our purposes, the crucial point is that in over a decade of working in the sovereign 
debt community, we have found no one willing to attribute functional significance to the 
promise not to seek a restructuring.24  On paper, it was a negative covenant, one of the 
most important structural elements of a business contract.25  In practice, it was a symbol, 
a marker, a cri de coeur, a plaintive never-again that made it crystal-clear to everyone 
how the banks felt about the events leading up to the contract.  It was the antithesis of 
stale boilerplate, a new provision that was most important in the very context where it 
was introduced – as a matter of expression – perhaps more so because it could have little, 
no, or highly uncertain practical effect on the behavior of the parties going forward. 
 
III. Liberté, égalité, fraternité 
 
In the 1988 film A Fish Called Wanda, the lead character makes her lovers jabber in 
foreign languages during intimate encounters.  Latin phrases occasionally play a similar 
role in business contracts.26  In the case we discuss below, the Latin term pari passu, 
whose meaning in sovereign debt contracts remains obscure and actively contested after a 
                                                 
23Interview of former Federal Reserve Board official (7 October 2005) on the condition of anonymity. 
24 Our observation is not based on statistical surveys of the sort that might be used to test the intuition 
advanced here; an in-depth empirical study is beyond the scope of this essay. 
25 Language and Norms, supra note 4. 
26More often, they merely blunt the drafter’s already weak inclination to innovate, perhaps because foreign-
language boilerplate has even greater potential than plain English to hide the wisdom of generations that 
came before.  See Gulati & Scott, supra note 3. 
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decade of litigation and academic debate, became a rallying cry and a focal point for 
creditor organization. 
 
A typical pari passu clause reads as follows: “All the obligations and liabilities of the 
Borrower hereunder rank, and will rank, either pari passu in rank of payment with or 
senior to all other unsubordinated Indebtedness of the Borrower.”27 The Latin phrase 
means “equally” or “in equal step.”  Such a clause has appeared in sovereign debt 
instruments since at least the late nineteenth century.  It is one of the few terms that has 
been continuously included in sovereign debt contracts since before World War II.   It 
was common in the handful of sovereign bonds issued in the 1960s and 1970s, continued 
in the commercial bank loans that ran into trouble in the 1980s, and remained common in 
the sovereign bonds of the 1990s and beyond.  Yet, it is not clear that the clause ever 
made any sense from an enforcement perspective.  Commentators have long highlighted 
the limited (or non-) utility of the clause in the sovereign setting.28  In domestic corporate 
bankruptcy, the notion of being in equal step has meaning because proceeds from 
liquidation are distributed among creditors in the order established in advance by statute 
and contract.29  Senior creditors go first, subordinated creditors take what is left, and all 
those in equal step recover ratably from the liquidation proceeds.  But sovereigns cannot 
be liquidated.  If there is no liquidation event where the assets of the sovereign are 
counted up and paid out, it is unclear when, if ever, the clause might be deployed.  Yet, 
for over a century, the clause has remained a staple of these sovereign contracts, even as 
other clauses have come and gone. 
 
                                                 
27 Lee C. Buchheit, How to Negotiate Eurocurrency Loan Agreements (London: International Financial 
Review, 1995) at 76-79. 
28See Qamar S. Siddiqui, “Some Critical Issues in Negotiations and Legal Drafting” in Lars Kalderén & 
Qamar S. Siddiqi, eds., Sovereign Borrowers: Guidelines on Legal Negotiations with Commercial Lenders 
(Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1984) 45 at 57 (“[the pari passu clause] is likely to have little 
practical significance in the case of a sovereign borrower, where there may not be an occasion for a forced 
distribution of the assets to unsecured claimants following the bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation of the 
borrower”). 
29 Jon Yard Arnason & Ian M. Fletcher, Practitioner’s Guide to Cross-Border Insolvencies,  looseleaf 
(Dobbs Ferry, NY : Oceana Publications, 2000) ENG-3 (“The principle of pari passu distribution applies 
only in liquidation”). 
 11 
A pari passu clause without more is a promise by the debtor not to subordinate the 
creditor to others that would, as a result, come ahead of it in an asset distribution.  For 
most of its history in sovereign debt instruments, the clause has been interpreted as going 
to the status or ranking of the debt, but not to the manner in which it will be serviced.  A 
stock example of a pari passu violation in the sovereign debt writing of the 1980s 
involved advance preferential earmarking of government revenues or foreign exchange.30  
The prevailing view of sovereign debt practitioners and writers appeared to be that the 
universe of such violations was extremely narrow, since earmarking and formal 
subordination are virtually unheard of in modern sovereign practice.  It was also 
commonly thought that a creditor facing discrimination in payment would seek redress 
under provisions that go specifically to payment, not to ranking.31  Our interviews for 
related projects suggest that a widely held view among sovereign debt cognoscenti in the 
mid-1990s was that no one knew quite what the clause meant.32  
 
The consensus, such as it was, came under attack in the fall of 1999, when Ecuador 
announced it would default on its Brady Bonds.  It made the mistake of trying to go about 
default in what must have seemed to Ecuador and its advisors a clever and nuanced way:  
it proposed to service uncollateralized Brady Bonds, draw down the collateral on the 
bonds secured by zero-coupon U.S. Treasury Bonds, and exempt Eurobonds from 
restructuring altogether in a last-ditch effort to preserve a prayer of accessing the capital 
                                                 
30 See e.g., Philip Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 
1980) at 156; William Tudor John, “Sovereign Risk and Immunity under English Law and Practice” in 
Robert S. Rendell ed. International Financial Law:Lending, capital transfers and institutions, vol. 1, 2d ed. 
(London: Euromoney  Publications, 1983) 79 at 96.  See also Brian W. Semkow, “Syndicating and 
Rescheduling International Financial Transactions: A Survey of the Legal Issues Encountered by 
Commercial Banks” (1984) 18 Int’l Law. 869 at 899 [Semkow].  Semkow makes a subtle but crucial move: 
he suggests that “discrimination against lending banks in the payment” of general revenues or foreign 
currency, rather than their advance earmarking, would be a pari passu violation in a sovereign loan 
contracts. 
31 For a survey of literature and arguments on the meaning of the pari passu clause, see Lee C. Buchheit & 
Jeremiah S. Pam, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,” (2004) 53 Emory L.J. 869; G. 
Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, “Sovereign Piracy” (2001) 56 Bus. Law. 635 [Gulati & Klee]. 
32 See e.g. Lee. C. Buchheit, “The pari passu clause sub specie aeternitatis” (1991) 10:12 Int’l. Fin. L. Rev. 
11 (“The fact that no one seems quite sure what the clause really means, at least in a loan to a sovereign 
borrower, has not stunted its popularity among drafters of loan agreements and debt restructuring 
agreements”); Philip R. Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell Press, 1995) at 165 (“In the state context, the meaning of the clause is uncertain because there is 
no hierarchy of payment which is legally enforced under a bankruptcy regime”). 
 12 
markets.33  Although giving creditors access to interest collateral was specifically 
contemplated in the underlying bond contracts, the bondholders’ response was irate.  Led 
by hedge fund manager Marc Hélie, they took the unprecedented step of accelerating the 
collateralized bond — a move that had been considered way beyond their organizing 
capacity – ostensibly to force Ecuador into “pari passu treatment” of its creditors.34  
Investors succeeded in forcing all private bonded debt into the restructuring, and Hélie 
briefly acquired folk hero status as “The Man Who Broke Ecuador”.  However, in the 
ensuing negotiations, he and his allies failed to secure a ratable payment profile among 
all of Ecuador’s official and private creditors.35 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, the key point is that, no matter what meaning pari 
passu may have had when first included in a sovereign debt instrument  or what meaning  
it may have acquired after a wave of high-profile court battles starting in 2000, by late 
1999, only one writer had suggested, and only in passing, that it conferred the right to 
ratable payment.36  This view ran counter to that of the leading writers and practitioners 
in the field.  Yet even though the Latin term probably did not mean what the Hélie and 
colleagues were demanding, it captured investor imaginations, and channeled righteous 
anger like no other legal or moral theory to condemn Ecuador’s wrongdoing.37 
Ecuador’s pari passu moment got almost completely drowned out the following year, 
after a Belgian court upheld the ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu clause in 
a lawsuit against Peru.38  That lawsuit jolted the sovereign debt establishment, and 
became the subject of innumerable articles in the scholarly and trade press, most of which 
                                                 
33 Felix Salmon, “The Buy Side Starts to Bite Back”, Euromoney, (April 2001) 46[Salmon]. 
34 “Living with the Dollar: Dollarization has put Ecuador's economy back on track after a disastrous 
rollercoaster ride that ended m default. Confidence is back, but the new currency poses new challenges. 
(Ecuador dollarization)” Latin Finance (March 2002) SS11 [Living with the Dollar]. ; see also Salmon, 
supra note 31; Soma Biwas, “Carrion at Ecuador's Gate” Latin Trade 8:3 (March 2000) 26. 
35 Salmon, supra note 32; Living with the Dollar, supra note 32. 
36 Semkow, supra note 28. 
37 Ironically, the term whereby Ecuador undertook never to seek a Brady Bond restructuring, discussed in 
the previous section, played a minor role in the debates surrounding its default. 
38 Elliott Assocs, L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 
26, 2000); see also Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 368 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
18, 2000) (executed Aug. 31, 2000) and Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld Dated August 31, 
2000, at 11-12 (footnote omitted), Elliott Assocs., 2000 WL 1449862 (96 Civ. 7916 (RWS), 96 Civ. 7917 
(RWS) (advocating the ratable payment interpretation). 
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were harshly critical of the court.39  Belgian legislation ultimately foreclosed the 
possibility of similar suits. However, copycat arguments proliferated in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, and at least in the United States, they have yet to be 
authoritatively resolved.40  Four years after Ecuador’s default, a cartoon that 
accompanied an article about pari passu in a U.K. trade journal featured the Oracle of 
Delphi opining on the meaning of the clause:  “Damned if I know!!!”41 
 
Nevertheless, beginning in 2003, pari passu was routinely elevated to the category of 
“Reserve Matters” in sovereign debt contracts in New York and London, which meant 
that amending the Latin would require the highest possible creditor voting threshold 
available under the contract.42  This newfound salience of the term was undoubtedly due 
at least in part to its surprising success in the courts.  But after the profound interpretive 
shock of the Elliott decision in Belgium, observers also expected the parties to clarify the 
meaning of the term:  merely making an admittedly inartful, litigation-prone clause 
harder to amend seemed counterintuitive.43   
 
The nearly forgotten rebellion of Ecuador’s bondholders in the fall of 1999 might suggest 
part of an explanation: whatever it might have meant as a legal matter, pari passu had 
                                                 
39 See e.g. Gulati & Klee, supra note 29; see also EMTA Position Regarding the Quest for More Orderly 
Sovereign Work-Outs (17 October 2002), online: Emerging Markets Traders Association 
<http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/keymsg1.pdf>. 
40For a summary of follow up litigation, see Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, “The Hunt for Pari Passu” 
(2004) 23:2 Int’l. Fin. L. Rev. 20 [Buchheit & Pam].  Bill Bratton uses principles of contract interpretation 
to argue persuasively that the clause is radically ambiguous.  William W. Bratton, “Pari Passu and a 
Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices” (2004) 53 Emory L.J. 823. 
41 Ibid. 
42The broader phenomenon of elevating some terms to the status of “Reserve Matters” is discussed in more 
detail in the next section.  It was motivated in large part by Ecuador’s use of exit consents in its 2000 debt 
exchange to strip out of its Bradies a group of non-financial terms that went to the liquidity and 
enforcement of the bonds.  The same technique was used to delete the “don’t even ask” provision discussed 
in the preceding section.  See supra note 14.  For more on the use of exit consents in sovereign debt 
instruments, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, “Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges” (2000) 
48 UCLA L. Rev. 59. 
 
43 Gulati & Scott, Supra note 3.  More recent empirical work supports the view that the new interpretation 
and contractual elevation of pari passu did not boost market perceptions of sovereign debt enforcement to 
any significant degree.  See Laura Alfaro, Noel Maurer & Faisal Ahmed, Empire and Lawsuits:  U.S. 
Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin America (Jul. 2009), forthcoming, Law & Contemporary 
Problems. 
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acquired unusual rhetorical pull as a symbol of equality and bondholder brotherhood in 
the face of sovereign venality.44  This expressive value was quite apart from the term’s 
capacity to make the debtor do the right thing, or make a court tell the debtor to do the 
right thing.  Pari passu was more than a novel legal argument; it was a slogan and an 
incantation. To some, amending it might have seemed akin to amending the words 
written on a banner that had flown over the barricades. 
 
IV. Sacred Rights and Profane Payments 
 
Our last example is a set of clauses that look perfectly functional at first blush—so 
functional, in fact, that a major trade association proposed them as part of its sovereign 
bond documentation template.  The peculiarity of these clauses, which struck us and 
some of the practitioners with whom we have discussed it, is their radical reversal of the 
priorities embedded in standard-form sovereign bond contracts only a few years earlier.  
Part of this whiplash effect may be attributable to the expressive motive, or feel-good 
formalism.  
 
As noted, emerging-markets sovereign bonds issued in New York between 1990 and 
2003 required the consent of each bondholder to amend payment terms.  The theories on 
the  origins and persistence of this unanimity requirement are numerous and still hotly 
debated across academic disciplines.45  Part of the impetus behind it in the early 1990s 
may have been a desire to make the Brady Bonds and their successors “senior” 
instruments, immune from restructuring.46  New York law instruments with unanimity 
                                                 
44 Hill suggests that contract terms may have a community-constituting function.  Hill, Language and 
Norms, supra note 4. 
45For legal perspectives, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, “Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will” 
(2002) 51 Emory L.J. 1317; William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, “Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best 
Interest of Creditors” (2004) 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1.  For debates among economists, see e.g. Anthony 
Richards & Mark Gugiatti, “Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from 
Emerging Markets” (2003) 6:3 International Finance 415; Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, “The Use of 
Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers” (2004) 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 
815; Barry Eichengreen, “Restructuring Sovereign Debt” (2003) 17:4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 75; 
Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, “Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?” (January 
2000), online: National Bureau of Economic Research < http://www.nber.org/papers/w7458.pdf> 
46 Hurlock & Alexander, supra note 11. 
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provisions dominated emerging markets debt issuance in the 1990s and early 2000s.47  
The rest comprised mainly English-law bonds, which could be amended with the consent 
of a bondholder majority.48   
 
By the mid-1990s, the official sector had come to see the amendment restrictions as a 
threat to financial stability.  Like some creditors, officials bought into the view that a 
unanimity requirement could effectively block debt renegotiation.  Conventional policy 
wisdom in 1995—1996 held that more sovereign debt distress was inevitable: that bonds 
had quickly become too big to exempt in any meaningful restructuring; and that any 
contract term that could block bond restructuring would lead to negotiating stalemate, 
protracted court battles and economic decline, worse than anything seen in the 1980s.49 
 
We have detailed elsewhere the complex combination of public and private effort that led 
to the shift away from unanimity to qualified majority amendment in New York 
sovereign bond practice beginning in 2003.50  Here we highlight a curious development 
in London after the New York shift.  Since 2003, most English-law sovereign bonds have 
retained, but tightened, the majority amendment formula for the payment terms.  Many 
New York and London contracts also elevated certain non-payment terms, such as pari 
passu, to Reserve Matter status on par with the payment terms.  But several English-law 
contracts went farther: they revived the unanimity requirement and applied it to litigation-
related terms, such as choice of law, choice of forum, submission to jurisdiction, waiver 
                                                 
47 See e.g., Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues online: International 
Monetary Fund <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2002/04/pdf/chp3.pdf> at 44 (citing New York 
law bonds comprising at least 80% of the market).     
48 The precise threshold varied, as did the way in which the amendment vote would be taken. See Anna 
Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, “Innovation after the Revolution:  Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 2003” 
(2009) 4 Capital Markets Law Journal 85 at 91-93. 
49See e.g., Group of Ten, The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A Report to the Ministers and 
Governors Prepared under the Auspices of the Deputies (1996) online: 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf >; Barry Eichengreen, et al., Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts 
for Sovereign Debtors (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995) (a volume commissioned by 
the Bank of England as part of its work on the Rey Report). 
50 We have detailed elsewhere the complex combination of public and private effort that led to the shift in 
Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, “Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study” (2006) 84 Wash. U.L.Q. 
1627. 
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of sovereign immunity, and the appointment of an agent for the service of process.51  
Thus if three-quarters of all bondholders in a recent issue by the Republic of Georgia 
agreed to forgive their debts entirely, they could do so and bind the quarter that wanted to 
be paid.  However, if the same creditors agreed to let the Republic  be sued in New York 
rather than London, they would likely run afoul of the unanimity requirement for 
litigation-related terms.  This special protection of judicial enforcement is also enshrined 
in the model clauses promulgated by the leading financial industry association in London, 
which served as a template for the few sovereign bonds that have adopted unanimity for 
non-financial terms.52 
 
Practitioners have told us that  raising the amendment threshold for litigation terms to 
100% was meant “to protect minority rights … [so that the] process for a suit is preserved 
if the minority believed there had been an anomaly in how the majority went about 
exercising collective action.”53  Creditors gave up the heretofore sacrosanct right to be 
paid in exchange for an immutable right to sue the sovereign—on a contract whose 
economic terms could be eviscerated by a supermajority vote of their colleagues.  One 
cynical law firm partner who counsels sovereign debtors observed: 
 
If seventy-five percent of the holders can vote to reduce the payment amount, who 
cares whether unanimity is required to alter the right to sue.  The seventy-five 
percent could reduce the payment obligation to zero.  What use would the right to 
sue be then?  This makes no sense.54   
 
This flip from privileging payment terms to privileging litigation terms could have any 
number of functional and historical explanations.  Maybe it made sense for creditors to 
reassess the value of an ironclad payment promise in a world of limited sovereign 
resources, no statutory bankruptcy regime to enforce payment priorities, and increasingly 
                                                 
51 See e.g., Republic of Georgia, Prospectus, $750,000,000 7.5% Notes Due 2013 (Apr. 11, 2008) at 79  
Lithuania, Serbia and Seychelles have similar provisions. 
52International Primary Market Association Standard Collective Action Clauses (CACs) for the Terms and 
Conditions of Sovereign Notes (October 28, 2004) online: International Capital Market Association 
<http://www.icmagroup.org/ICMAGroup/files/3c/3cc80d90-da99-4562-8ef2-f604a8e5963e.PDF> [New 
CACs]. 
53Telephone interview of creditor counsel (6 August 2008) on the condition of anonymity.  It is not clear to 
what extent freezing the sovereign’s submission to jurisdiction might facilitate inter-creditor enforcement.  
Cf. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 43 (discussing inter-creditor duties under sovereign bond contracts).  
54 Telephone interview of debtor counsel (11 August 2009) on the condition of anonymity. 
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frequent debt exchanges that circumvented unanimity to achieve deep debt relief.55   Yet 
the elevation of judicial enforcement terms made less sense.  Despite a handful of high-
profile settlements and a spike in lawsuits on sovereign bonds (mostly arising out of 
Argentina’s $100 billion default in late 2002), litigation-related recoveries from 
sovereigns remained minuscule, while the lawsuits’ deterrent effect was undetectable.  
Litigation was not much more effective at getting governments to perform in 2008 than it 
had been in 1998.  But it is the conjunction of the two trends that is hardest to understand:  
the right to sue is protected when the substantive cause of action is most likely to be 
taken away.  Litigation is hard enough where there is a debt to sue on; it is hard to 
imagine where the debt has been amended away.56 
 
Other parts of the model clauses proposed by the U.K. industry group may help solve the 
riddle of unanimity’s revival.  Apart from judicial enforcement terms, the model 
recommended requiring unanimous bondholder consent to amend any terms in a debt 
exchange in ways that discriminate against the old debt holders.57  Such a provision 
would make it impossible for a sovereign to use exit consents to render old bonds illiquid 
and unenforceable as part of a debt exchange, much as Ecuador had done in 2000.  The 
unanimity barrier to the use of exit consents, along with the use of unanimity to freeze 
creditors’ right to sue the sovereign, both reacted to Ecuador’s Brady Bond restructuring.  
However, the exit consent technique is less important—some say practically irrelevant— 
now that bonds issued under New York law have adopted majority-modification 
provisions.  As a result, we suspect that the motive for elevating litigation terms in this 
context was, in significant part, expressive and symbolic.  Creditors sought to protect the 
right to sue the sovereign above the economic terms, even where lawsuits “have not 
                                                 
55Argentina’s 2005 exchange was among the most aggressive; it left creditors with less than 40 cents on the 
dollar. See Arturo C. Porzecanski, “From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s 
Default” (2005) 6 Chicago J. Int’l L. 311 (this account generally tracks the creditor perspective); see also 
Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyerm Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises 
(Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006) (summarizing half a dozen debt 
restructuring operations). 
56One law firm partner representing creditors suggested that the right to sue under such circumstances 
would give dissenting creditors a valuable right to challenge the process by which the payment terms were 
amended.  Interview with creditor counsel, supra note 51.  We find this to be a plausible but limited 
explanation; other lawyers we have interviewed were even more skeptical. 
57New CACs, supra note 50. 
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yielded one cent on the dollar”58 or discernibly deterred default, to reaffirm the salience 
of “creditor rights”, and register continued opposition to obnoxious restructuring tactics. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
We have speculated that parties may sometimes include terms in complex business 
contracts because they feel better for saying it, even where they know full well that the 
term will do little or nothing to advance their cause.  This intuition is not part of the 
conventional accounts of contracting, although it is consistent with the recent trend to see 
contracts as more than instrumental devices that do what they say,59 as well as with 
established theories of contracts as vehicles for parties to tell the world about their 
relationship.60  If future research bears out our suspicions, it would also cast a different 
light on the canons of contract interpretation, which demand that judges either give 
functional meaning to a contract  clause, or refuse to enforce it as unsupported by a 
bargain.  We suspect that there are times when parties do not intend for judges to enforce 
their contract term as written, even where its structural position – for example, as a 
covenant rather than a recital – might suggest that it was supposed to “do something” 
rather than just “say something”.  Yet such a term is far from illusory; on the contrary, it 
may be the product of hard bargaining, knowingly exchanged for the other side’s 
substantial promises. 
 
There are many kinds of non-functional clauses and many motives for their inclusion.  
We limit our speculation to one—w call it feel-good formalism—where a party derives 
value from putting words in its contract to get something off its chest, to say it “out loud” 
in the formal contractual setting, without regard for the term’s technical efficacy.   
 
                                                 
58 H.W. Urban, GMBH et al. v. Republic of Argentina, Hearing Transcript before Hon. Thomas B. Griesa, 
District Judge, Nov. 16, 2004, at 18. 
59See e.g. Mark C. Suchman, “The Contract as Social Artifact” (2003) 370:1 Law & Soc'y Rev. 91; see 
also Hill, “Language and Norms”, supra note 4. 
60 This is part of “channeling” in Lon Fuller’s typology of contract functions. Lon L. Fuller, “Consideration 
and Form” (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 at 801-03[Fuller]. 
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The three anecdotes in our essay, all of which come from the emerging markets sovereign 
debt setting, suggest different ways in which feel-good formalism may be present in 
contracting.  These range from purely feel-good terms – we suspect these are rare – to 
suboptimal terms that may persist in part because the parties find them emotionally 
potent, to contract innovation practices that may represent an emotional reaction to an 
earlier event in, or even outside, the contracting relationship.  In most cases, such terms 
and practices will also have functional dimensions, and may have other nonfunctional 
ones – as symbols or signals directed at the outside world.61  Our argument, then, is 
narrow:  it goes to one motive among many for including a term in a complex business 
contract. 
 
The pure feel-good motive is not prominent in the contracts literature, although it is 
implicated in practices that have periodically received considerable scholarly attention.  
This essay flags it in a particular setting, where enforcement is limited by sovereign 
immunity and the lack of an international infrastructure for sovereign debt restructuring.  
In this setting, precisely because of the enforcement difficulties, it may be relatively easy 
to identify nonsense terms.62  Future research might ask whether the phenomenon is 
idiosyncratic to the sovereign debt world.  
 
The relationship between a sovereign debtor and its creditors is distinct from private 
debtor-creditor relationships that drive the contracts literature, not least because the 
borrowing state still enjoys considerable protections under the law of sovereign 
immunity.  However, the lawyers and contracting routines are the same in sovereign and 
large corporate settings.  Lawyers go about negotiating and analyzing contracts in 
sovereign deals much as they do in other deals; this overlap is evident in the similarities 
of contract structure and language.  If they find it useful to insert nonsense terms in 
sovereign contracts, we suspect these same rationales carry over to other settings.   
 
                                                 
61 See Fuller, supra note 58; see e.g. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, “Contracts as a Barrier to Entry” 
(1987) 77 The American Economic Review 388. 
62 Sovereign debt contracts from the pre-World War II era likely have a much larger set of feel-good terms, 
given that enforcement was even less likely. Cf. Mark Weidemaier, “Haggling Over… What Exactly?”  
online: The Faculty Lounge  <http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2009/08/haggling-over-what-exactly.html>.   
